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The success of human cooperation crucially depends on mechanisms enabling individuals to
detect unreliability in their conspecifics. Yet, how such epistemic vigilance is achieved from
naturalistic sensory inputs remains unclear. Here we show that listeners’ perceptions of the
certainty and honesty of other speakers from their speech are based on a common prosodic
signature. Using a data-driven method, we separately decode the prosodic features driving
listeners’ perceptions of a speaker’s certainty and honesty across pitch, duration and loud-
ness. We find that these two kinds of judgments rely on a common prosodic signature that is
perceived independently from individuals’ conceptual knowledge and native language. Finally,
we show that listeners extract this prosodic signature automatically, and that this impacts the
way they memorize spoken words. These findings shed light on a unique auditory adaptation
that enables human listeners to quickly detect and react to unreliability during linguistic
interactions.
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Peers are not always reliable, either because they possesserroneous beliefs, are not willing to share their knowledge,or even intentionally try to deceive others1–3. When making
collective decisions, exchanging information, or learning from
others, it is therefore crucial to evaluate both the certainty that
social partners have in the information they are providing (i.e.,
how much they believe the information they possess to be true)
and how honest they are (i.e., whether they are actually com-
municating the information they believe to be true)1,4,5. It has
been argued that humans possess dedicated mechanisms of
epistemic vigilance, allowing them to detect when a person should
not be trusted1. Such mechanisms would enable cumulative cul-
ture to materialize and persist in humans, because they ensure
that unreliable information does not spread easily1,6, and enable
groups to cooperate efficiently by weighting individuals’ con-
tributions depending on their degree of certainty4. Yet, there is
still much to explore about the perceptual, cognitive, and meta-
cognitive mechanisms that support the detection of certainty and
honesty in social partners.
Natural languages typically possess specific markers allowing
speakers to explicitly and deliberately communicate their level of
certainty7–9. These linguistic markers may consist in dedicated
expressions such as “I don’t know”8 or rely on more indirect
systems of evidentials whereby speakers point towards the source
of their knowledge7, or on socio-pragmatic means7,9. Optimally
sharing certainty in such explicit ways is costly however, since
partners need to calibrate the way they communicate their con-
fidence to one another10, converge on shared linguistic expres-
sions through effortful processes involving conversational
alignment and cultural learning8,11, and rely on analytical (or
system 2) thinking1,6,12. Yet, the highly adaptive function of
epistemic vigilance1,6 and the fact that even young children filter
information from unreliable informants5 suggest that simpler,
low-level mechanisms may have evolved to enable the fast and
automatic detection of unreliability in social partners, across
languages and cultures.
Consequently, other streams of research have focused on para-
linguistic markers and provided some evidence that listeners can
infer speakers’ levels of certainty from the insertion of pauses (i.e.,
hesitations) or fillers (e.g., “huum”), dedicated gestures (i.e., flipping
palms or shrugging), and specific prosodic signatures9,13–15.
Research in this field typically involves elicitation procedures
comprising two phases9,13,14,16. First, encoders (trained actors14,17
or speakers in a semi-naturalistic setting13,16) are recorded while
expressing utterances with various levels of certainty. In a second
phase, acoustic analysis of these recordings is performed, and lis-
teners are asked to recover the degree of certainty expressed by the
speakers. Acoustic analyses of these recordings typically reveal that
speakers’ uncertainty is associated with decreased volume and rising
intonation9,13,14,18, and to a lesser extent higher14 (yet also some-
times lower16) mean pitch as well as slower13,14,16,19 (yet also
sometimes faster18) speech rate.
While these studies show that listeners are able to infer
speakers’ uncertainty from the sound of their voice13,14,16,19,20,
the precise perceptual representations used by listeners to per-
form these judgments remain unclear. First, because these pro-
sodic signatures are typically examined in procedures where
speakers deliberately produce them, it is unknown whether, at a
fundamental level, they are inherently communicative (i.e., nat-
ural or conventional signals)21,22 as opposed to constituting
natural signs22, e.g., of cognitive effort18,19,23 (throughout the
paper, we use “natural” by opposition with “conventional” to
refer to meaning that relies on intrinsic and recurrent associa-
tions, rather than arbitrary, culturally learned conventions24,25).
Second, because they critically depend on how speakers encode
the target attitude in the first place, these studies offer no
guarantee that what is encoded by the speaker actually corre-
sponds to genuine prosodic signatures of certainty: speakers
asked to display certainty may also convey social traits such as
dominance (associated with lower pitch) or trustworthiness
(associated with higher pitch)26,27; these social traits may mediate
subsequent ratings of certainty, but the corresponding vocal sig-
natures (e.g., mean pitch) cannot be presumed to be inherently
related to certainty. Investigating separately the perception and
production of these prosodic signatures is crucial in this regard:
although of course they are intimately linked, they do not always
rely on the same underlying mechanisms. For instance, mean
pitch is not strictly tied to body size in speech production (for-
mant dispersion is), still, listeners use this information to perceive
body size and related social traits such as dominance because of a
general perceptual bias linking low pitch with largeness27. Third,
there are important differences between portrayed and sponta-
neous prosodic displays28: actors’ productions may reflect ste-
reotypical rather than veridical expressions, and in addition, they
may not be aware of all the prosodic signatures that are naturally
produced and used by listeners to perceive honesty and certainty.
Finally, because acoustic features typically co-vary in speech
production29, such paradigms do not allow examining how
speech rate, pitch, and loudness statically and dynamically impact
listeners’ perception independently from one other. In short,
because these procedures are correlational in nature, they do not
inform us about the underlying perceptual, cognitive, and meta-
cognitive mechanisms that drive these judgments.
Interestingly, the markers of uncertainty identified in these
studies closely resemble the acoustic signatures that have been
associated with mental and articulatory effort: the tension and
frequency of vocal fold vibrations—and thus pitch and pitch
variability—increase with cognitive load30 and psychological
stress31,32. Higher effort is also associated with slower and more
variable articulation rate30,33, and with a disruption of the
“default” pattern associating higher pitch and volume to the
beginning of an utterance, and lower pitch and volume to the end
of the utterance, a natural consequence of the decrease in sub-
glottal air pressure during the exhalation phase of breathing23,34.
Relatedly, prosodies intended to be neutral can actually be judged
to reflect certainty14. Given the link between uncertainty and
cognitive (dis)fluency35,36, it is probable that the prosodic sig-
natures typically associated with states of uncertainty essentially
constitute natural signs of cognitive effort, stemming from phy-
siological constrains on speech production23. If such was the case,
we might expect that the same core prosodic signature may be
used for other social evaluations related to speaker reliability that
are also thought to involve increased cognitive effort, such as
lying2,37.
Genuine communication of certainty occurs when senders are
actually willing to share their true commitment to the proposition
they express38. Yet, it would also be adaptive to have means to
detect speakers’ commitment to a proposition when they are not
willing to share this information (e.g., when they are trying to
deceive). Even though lying speakers—by definition—do not
deliberately signal their unreliability, dishonesty may also be
detected from prosody if speakers involuntarily manifest signs of
cognitive disfluency. Yet, while lying is thought to be associated
with increased cognitive effort2,37, research examining whether
this has stable behavioral consequences has produced mixed
results. Thus, whether humans are actually able to exploit beha-
vioral cues to spot liars remains mysterious despite intense
scrutiny2,3. If anything, speech prosody is thought to carry more
reliable markers of deception than other behaviors, such as gaze
aversion2,39–41. Similarly to doubt, pitch tends to increase39,41
during lies, and speech rate to decrease, although this latter
relationship is less reliable2,42,43.
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Taken together, these two separate strands of literature suggest
that a common, core prosodic signature of cognitive effort may in
fact support both social perceptions of certainty and honesty3,23.
Here we directly test this hypothesis in 4 studies involving 115
listeners. In a first experiment, we use psychophysical reverse
correlation to identify the perceptual representations used by
listeners to infer the honesty and certainty of a speaker in a
decontextualized, forced-choice task, and find that both types or
judgments are supported by strikingly similar perceptual repre-
sentations across three acoustic features: intonation, loudness,
and speech rate. In three additional experiments, we then
acoustically manipulate speech stimuli to display this common
prosodic signature. This allows us to: (1) provide mechanistic
evidence that this prosodic signature is indeed implicated in both
types of judgments in a contextualized situation (Study 2A), and
to show that (2) it is processed independently from participants’
concepts about epistemic prosody (Study 2B), (3) it is perceived
cross-linguistically (Study 3), and (4) it automatically impacts
verbal working memory (Study 4), as would be expected of a core
prosodic signature originating from physiological reactions
associated with cognitive effort (i.e., of a natural sign) as opposed
to a culturally learned convention.
Finally, if social perceptions of a speaker’s certainty and honesty
rely on similar perceptual inputs, they may differ at higher levels
of processing to allow listeners to differentially interpret these
signatures for one or the other judgment. For social perceptions of
certainty, speakers’ intentions should make little difference in
interpreting the prosodic displays, since, whether they are delib-
erately produced14,16 or automatically shown18,19, similar displays
are observed. Crucially however, there is an important asymmetry
in the case of dishonesty: on the one hand, signatures of cognitive
effort may involuntarily be disclosed by a deceitful speaker, but on
the other hand, a display suggestive of little cognitive effort may be
deliberately shown to simulate certainty2,16. Thus judgments
about dishonesty can hardly reduce to perceptual decisions and
would necessarily engage additional inferences (e.g., is the situa-
tion cooperative or competitive? what is the social cost of signaling
dishonesty? etc.) in order to infer speakers’ true intentions and
interpret the display2,3,6. Given this, we hypothesized that, while
judgments about honesty and certainty may rely on similar per-
ceptual inputs, the type of inferences made upon these inputs
would differ and lead to potentially different outcomes for con-
textualized judgments. By comparing judgments about certainty
and dishonesty made in different contexts, but on the basis of the
same stimuli (Study 2A), we show that, indeed, providing listeners
with additional information regarding speakers’ incentives (e.g.,
that they are potentially trying to deceive) has no impact on
participants’ interpretation of the prosodic signature for judg-
ments of certainty, but introduces important inter-individual
variability for judgments of dishonesty.
Taken together, these results provide a comprehensive account
of the perceptive, cognitive, and metacognitive mechanisms that
allow human listeners to quickly detect and react to unreliability
during linguistic interactions.
Results
In the first study, instead of relying on actors to produce ste-
reotypical expressions of certainty and honesty16,17, we took
inspiration from a recent series of data-driven studies in visual
cognition, in which facial prototypes of social traits were derived
from human judgments of thousands of computer-generated
visual stimuli44,45. Using a similar psychophysical technique—
reverse correlation22—we manipulated the pitch, duration, and
loudness of spoken pseudo-words with acoustic signal-processing
algorithms21 in order to create random prosodies, thereby
sampling a large space corresponding to the range of naturally
produced speech (see “Methods”). We asked 20 (11 females)
native speakers of French to evaluate the certainty and honesty of
a speaker in 2 distinct testing sessions separated by 1 week. Each
participant heard 880 pairs of these randomly manipulated sti-
muli, each pair being matched in terms of pseudo-word and
speaker identity (thus canceling out their contribution). Partici-
pants were asked to indicate which of the two exemplars sounded
more dishonest (in one session) or certain (in the other session,
the order of the sessions was counterbalanced across partici-
pants), before stating how confident they were in their judgment.
For each participant and each task (certainty/honesty), we com-
puted perceptual representations in the form of normalized
temporal kernels. We subtracted the pitch, loudness, and duration
of the voices classified as reliable (i.e., honest or certain) from the
pitch, loudness, and duration of the voices classified as unreliable
(i.e., dishonest or doubtful). This was done for 12 temporal points
in a word for pitch and loudness and 5 for duration (see
“Methods” for details).
Thus, instead of acoustically analyzing naturalistic speech, here
we use listeners’ classifications of randomly manipulated pseudo-
words to reconstruct the perceptual representations that underlie
their judgments in an agnostic, data-driven manner. This pro-
cedure has three main advantages over the elicitation paradigm.
First, it allows decorrelating perception from production by
sampling agnostically from a large feature space rather than
focusing on a smaller space sampled by experimenters46 or
actors14 and thus constrained by their own perception. Second, it
allows an unconstrained and unbiased test of the hypothesis that
listeners’ perception of the certainty and honesty of a speaker rely
on a common prosodic signature at the perceptual level, by
probing listeners’ representations for the two attitudes separately
before comparing them within the same frame of reference.
Third, rather than correlating acoustical features with judgments,
this reverse correlation procedure amounts to building a com-
putational model in which observers make perceptual decisions
by comparing exemplars to a fixed internal template (or, in the
language of Volterra/Wiener analysis, a kernel), which the above
procedure learns from decision data47. This model can then be
tested in a causal manner, by acoustically manipulating novel
speech stimuli to match participants’ kernels, and test their
consequence on judgments made by other participants, as we do
in Study 2, 3, and 4. Depending on the strength and precision of
listeners’ internal representations, classification judgments would
be more or less precise, and the kernels recovered through this
procedure would deviate from baseline accordingly (e.g., a listener
who does not have any internal representation concerning honest
prosodies would show a flat kernel that would not deviate from
chance level).
A last important aspect of the first study is that we relied on a
two-alternative forced-choice procedure, which not only allows
bypassing individual decisional biases (e.g., a truth-bias where
observers tend to assume that speakers are honest3,40, or con-
versely, a lie-bias2) but also assessing the specific contribution of
prosody to social perceptions (the effects of word and speaker
identity being discarded because stimuli of a given pair were
similar for these aspects). This allows us to specifically uncover
perceptual representations of certainty/honesty in a context-free
and unbiased manner, contrary to absolute, continuous judg-
ments (e.g., on a Likert scale) typically used in past studies14,46,
that reflected a mixture of perceptual and decisional processes.
A common prosodic signature supports listeners’ perceptions
of honesty and certainty (Study 1). Despite the fact that both
tasks (certainty/honesty) were separated by an interval of 1 week,
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and the large variety of random tokens presented to the listeners,
we found that the perceptual representations obtained for honesty
and certainty were strikingly similar for all three acoustic
dimensions (Fig. 1a). Below, we detail the results for each acoustic
dimension, first reporting how sensory evidence dynamically
impacted participants’ judgments (Fig. 1a), before describing
global effects, assessing how mean pitch, loudness, and duration
(Fig. 1b), and the variability of each acoustic feature (Fig. 1c),
impacted participants’ judgments.
Regarding pitch, a linear mixed regression, including partici-
pant as a random factor and segment, task (certainty/honesty),
and their interaction as fixed factors, revealed a significant linear
effect of segment (X2= 22.76, p= 0.02, t=−3.65, beta=−0.04
+/− 0.01 sem), no main effect of task (X2= 0.25, p= 0.61, t=
0.5, beta= 0.003+/− 0.004 sem), and no interaction between
segment and task (X2= 12.24, p= 0.35, t=−1.95, beta=−0.02
+/− 0.01 sem). The impact of segment reflected the fact that, as
can be seen on Fig. 1a, falling intonations were perceived as more
certain/honest. This is consistent with the fact that, in production,
speakers’ certainty is specifically related to lower pitch toward the
end of the word14, over and beyond other aspects such as sensory
evidence or accuracy18. Importantly, there was no significant
effect of task, and no interaction between segment and task,
suggesting that the shape of the kernels was equivalent for both
certainty and honesty.
To analyze whether mean pitch also impacted participants’
decisions, we constructed for each participant and each task the
psychometric curves relating the difference in pitch between the
two stimuli (approximated via the area in between the two
dynamic profiles, see “Methods”) to choice probability (see Fig. 1b,
and Fig. 2c for slopes computed over the group and all acoustic
dimensions). This analysis revealed that mean pitch was not a
good predictor of participants’ judgments: slopes did not
significantly differ from chance level in the two tasks (certainty:
M=−0.05+/− 0.35 SD, Z(18)= 71, p= 0.33, d= 0.14; honesty:
M=−0.02+/− 0.5 SD, Z(18)= 63, p > 0.19, d= 0.04; Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests were used because slopes were not normally
distributed). Thus mean pitch is not a stable feature used by
listeners to perceive certainty/honesty, contrary to intonation. This
contrasts with previous findings examining prosodic signatures of
certainty using elicitation procedures14,16, and with a previous
study using a similar methodology and sample size, where lower
pitch was found to strongly impact judgments about social
dominance26. By contrast, this is consistent with recent evidence
suggesting that speakers’ mean pitch is not necessarily impacted
by their certainty in the absence of an audience, while intonation
is18. Taken together, these findings suggest that mean pitch (i.e., a
frequency code) is predominantly relevant for judgments
concerned with the personal level (e.g., social traits of dominance),
while dynamic pitch variations (i.e., intonation) are more relevant
at the attitudinal level (e.g., of certainty, relating to effort or
production codes)23,26. By contrast, and consistently with the
hypothesis that these perceptual representations are related to
cognitive effort, pitch variability was a good predictor of
participants’ judgments (Fig. 1c): stimuli that were judged to be
reliable had less variable pitch (mean standard deviation difference
in the honesty task: −0.15+/− 0.13 SD, one-sample t test against
zero: t(18)=−4.74, p < 0.001, d= 1.11; certainty task: −0.08+/−
0.13 SD, t(18)=−2.64, p= 0.017, d= 0.62; the difference between
the two tasks was marginal: t(18)= 2, p= 0.058, d= 0.53).
Regarding loudness, there was a significant quadratic effect of
segment (X2= 60.18, p < 0.001, t= 3.24, beta= 0.05+/−
0.014 sem), no main effect of task (X2= 1.68, p > 0.19, t= 1.3,
beta= 0.007+/− 0.005 sem), and no interaction between segment
and task (X2= 14.34, p= 0.21, t=−0.37, beta=−0.0005+/−
0.014 sem). Voices perceived as certain/honest were louder,
especially at the beginning of the word. Again, task did not
significantly impact kernels, or interact with segment, suggesting
relatively preserved shapes across the two types of judgments. At
the static level, the slopes of the psychometric functions did not
significantly differ from chance level in the two tasks (certainty: M
=−0.04+/− 0.15 SD, Z(18)= 74, p > 0.3, d= 0.23; honesty:
M=−0.01+/− 0.15 SD, Z(18)= 90, p > 0.8, d= 0.07 (Fig. 1b).
Thus, as was the case for pitch, our results highlight the importance
of examining dynamic profiles rather than average features: precise
patterns of accentuation allow listeners to discriminate certainty
and honesty, rather than global increases in volume. Contrary to
pitch, variability in loudness did not impact judgments (mean
standard deviation difference in the honesty task: −0.012+/− 0.06
SD, t(18)= 0.9, p > 0.3, d= 0.2; certainty task:−0.007+/− 0.08 SD,
t(18)=−0.38, p= 0.7, d= 0.09; no difference between tasks: t(18)
=−1.25, p > 0.2, d= 0.28).
Finally, a similar pattern of results was found for the dynamic
analysis of duration: there was a significant quadratic effect of
segment (X2= 14.55, p= 0.006, t=−3.73, beta=−0.12+/−
0.03 sem), no main effect of task (X2= 1.37, p > 0.24, t=−1.19,
beta=−0.02+/− 0.015 sem), and no interaction between segment
and task (X2= 0.87, p > 0.9, t= 0.72, beta= 0.02+/− 0.03 sem).
Regardless of the segment, there was also a global effect such that
faster voices were more likely to be perceived as certain (mean
slope=−0.14+/− 0.2 SD, Z(18)= 33, p= 0.012, d= 0.67), and
marginally so in the case of honesty (mean slope=−0.08+/− 0.16
SD, Z(18)= 47, p= 0.053, d= 0.5), with a marginal difference in
sensitivity between the two tasks (Z(18)= 49, p= 0.064, d= 0.3).
Thus, unlike pitch and loudness, duration impacted judgments in a
more global fashion. Similar to pitch, variability in speech rate
impacted judgments, with more variability associated with less
reliability (mean standard deviation difference in the honesty task:
−0.003+/− 0.003 SD, t(18)=−4.06, p < 0.001, d= 0.96; certainty
task: −0.002+/− 0.003 SD, t(18)=−2.94, p= 0.008, d= 0.69; no
difference between tasks: t(18)= 1.3, p > 0.2, d= 0.25).
Overall, there was very little difference between the two tasks,
which suggests that a common prosodic signature subtends both
types of judgments (also see Fig. SI for the global kernels
collapsed across the two tasks). Importantly, there was no impact
of task order on the kernels (i.e., whether the certainty or the
honesty task was performed first; all p values >0.4), no interaction
between task order and segment (all p values >0.5), nor task
order, segment, and task (all p values >0.4) for any of the three
acoustic dimensions. Thus the kernels were not affected by
whether participants performed one or the other task before,
which rules out an interpretation in terms of carry-over effects
(i.e., participants keeping a strategy developed during the first
task to perform the second task).
Because we observed inter-individual differences between
these kernels among the different listeners tested (see Fig.
SIIA), we conducted further analyses to confirm the similarity
of the kernels between the two tasks at an individual level,
complementing our above group-level conclusions. We found
that the correlations between the kernels of the same
individuals across the two tasks were significantly higher than
the correlations between the kernels of different individuals
within the same task or across the two tasks (see Fig. SIIB).
Additional analyses also revealed that there were differences in
how female and male listeners used specific prosodic dimen-
sions to categorize stimuli, with male participants being more
sensitive to loudness and duration than females, but strikingly,
these gender differences were reflected similarly in both tasks
(see Fig. SIII). Thus, despite some idiosyncrasies regarding how
acoustic dimensions are weighted against one another, and
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Fig. 1 Reverse correlation results (study 1). a Dynamic prosodic representations. Normalized kernels derived from the reverse correlation analyses in both
tasks (top: certainty, blue; bottom: honesty, green) across the three acoustical dimensions (pitch, loudness, and duration). Filter amplitudes (a.u., arbitrary
units) correspond to the values obtained for each participant, task, acoustic dimension, and segment by subtracting the average (pitch, loudness, and
duration) values obtained for stimuli judged as certain/honest from the values averaged for the unchosen stimuli and normalizing these values for each
participant by dividing them by the sum of their absolute values. Data show group averages, with shaded areas showing the SEMs. Significant deviations
from zero (one-sample two-sided t tests) are indicated at the corresponding segment positions by circles, with increasing sizes corresponding to p < 0.1;
p < 0.05; p < 0.01, and p < 0.001; certainty task (p values per segment for pitch: 0.86, 0.69, 0.91, 0.64, 0.77, 0.49, 0.11, 0.11, 0.13, 0.14, 0.01, 0.004;
loudness: 0.0005, 0.51, 0.37, 0.007, 0.38, 0.18, 0.0001, 0.0001, 0.44, 0.22, 0.12, 0.16; duration: 0.6, 0.03, 0.07, 0.04, 0.94); honesty task (pitch: 0.33,
0.29, 0.44, 0.34, 0.14, 0.09, 0.03, 0.06, 0.08, 0.30, 0.62, 0.30; loudness: 0.29, 0.24, 0.07, 0.01, 0.002, 0.53, 0.96, 0.17, 0.42, 0.5, 0.098, 0.88; duration:
0.98, 0.24, 0.30, 0.048, 0.94). Kernels were computed for 5 time points for duration (corresponding to the initial values of the audio transformations) and
in 12 time points for pitch and duration (corresponding to post-transformation acoustic analysis of the stimuli, see “Methods”). Individual raw (i.e., non-
normalized) kernels are shown in Fig. SII.a. b Sensitivity to mean features. To assess the extent to which mean pitch, loudness, and duration affected
participants’ judgments at a static level, we constructed for each participant and task psychometric functions relating sensory evidence (computed for each
trial as the area under the curve corresponding to the difference between the dynamic profiles of the first minus second stimuli) to participant’s choices
(i.e., the probability to choose the first stimulus). Bar plots show the slopes averaged over the group separately in each task, with error bars showing the
SEM. Dots show individual data. The white asterisk shows the result of one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test with p < 0.05; pitch (0.33/0.19), loudness
(0.4/0.84), duration (0.012/0.053). c Sensitivity to feature variability. For each trial, the standard deviation of the pitch, loudness, and duration for the
stimuli judged as more reliable (honest, certain) were subtracted from the stimuli judged as less reliable (lying, doubtful; Δ: difference). Bar plots show the
slopes averaged over the group separately in each task, with error bars showing the SEM. Dots show individual data. White asterisks show the result of
one-sample t test against chance with p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; pitch (certainty p= 0.017/honesty p= 0.0002); loudness variability (0.7/0.4);
duration variability (0.009/0.0007). Source data are provided as a Source data file.
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substantial inter-individual differences regarding the exact
shape of the kernels, each participant represented certain and
honest prosodies similarly at the perceptual level.
In summary, voices were perceived to be unreliable (i.e.,
doubtful or lying) if they had rising intonation, less intensity at
the beginning of each syllable, and slower speech rate. These
results—obtained through a data-driven method, and thus not
subject to biases stemming from experimenters’ expectations and
perception of the stimuli—are in line with previous observations
examining honest and certain prosodies separately with actor-
produced expressions concerning intonation14,39,42. By contrast,
they suggest that other aspects, in particular mean pitch, are not
specifically discriminative when prosodic dimensions are also
dynamically manipulated, which might explain previous dis-
crepancies in the literature14,16.
Overlap between the two types of judgments evidenced
through choice consistency across the two tasks (Study 1). To
further examine the proximity of the judgments given for the two
social attitudes, we examined the percentage of agreement between
responses given across the two tasks (by analogy with the double-
pass consistency technique, see below), since they were based on the
exact same pairs of stimuli (for each pair, agreement= 1 if the same
stimulus was classified both as certain and honest, agreement= 0
otherwise). Agreement (M= 61.4%+/− 9 SD) was highly sig-
nificantly above chance (t(18)= 5, p < 0.001, d= 1.18) and
remarkably high considering the large number of exemplars heard
by the participants, and the fact that they performed the two tasks
with 1 week apart (see Fig. 2a). In addition, participants were more
confident in their choices when they provided converging (0.08
+/− 0.05) as compared to diverging judgments (−0.16+/− 0.13, t
(15)= 5.2, p < 0.001, d= 2.48; 3 participants were excluded from
analysis regarding confidence because they did not use the scale
appropriately, see “Methods”). This indicates that the exemplars
that were judged consistently in the two tasks were easier to classify,
probably because they better matched mental representations of
unreliable or reliable prosodies.
Fig. 2 Stability and precision of the perceptual decisions made in the two tasks. a Top: percentage of agreement across the two tasks (computed as the
percentage of trials in which stimuli were classified similarly: voices classified as certain and honest versus doubting and lying correspond to an
agreement). White asterisks show the significance of the result of the two-sided t test comparing the percentage of agreement between tasks with chance
level (50%) and reported in the main text, with *** corresponding to p < 0.001. Bottom: normalized (z-scored) confidence ratings averaged separately for
agreements and disagreements. Black asterisk shows the result of the two-sided t test comparing confidence for agreements versus disagreements
reported in the main text, with *** corresponding to p < 0.001. Data are presented as mean values with error bars showing the 95% confidence interval.
Dots show individual data. b Top: percentage of agreement within each task, computed as the percentage of double-pass trials in which stimuli were
classified similarly. White asterisks show the significance of the result of the two-sided t test comparing the percentage of agreement within each task with
chance level (50%) reported in the main text, with *** corresponding to p < 0.001. The black asterisk shows the results of the two-sided t test comparing
the two tasks reported in the main text; *p= 0.02. Bottom: confidence ratings depending on agreement in the honesty (green) and certainty (blue) tasks.
Green (honesty task) and blue (certainty task) asterisks show the result of the two-sided t test comparing confidence for agreements versus
disagreements within each task, with *** corresponding to p < 0.001. Data are presented as mean values with error bars showing the 95% confidence
interval. Dots show individual data. c Probability of responding that the first voice (p(choose S1)) sounds more certain (left, blue) or honest (right, green) as
a function of the area under the curve computed by subtracting sensory evidence for the first minus the second stimuli, summed for the three acoustic
dimensions. Darker lines correspond to high confidence trials (above the median) and lighter lines to low confidence trials (below the median). Circles
show mean values and error bars the 95% confidence interval. d Average confidence, sensitivity, metacognitive sensitivity, and efficiency in the honesty
and certainty tasks. Data represent mean values with error bars showing the 95% confidence interval, and dots show the individual data; black asterisks
show the result of the two-sided tests comparing the two tasks, and white asterisks show the results of two-sided tests against chance level; t tests were
used for confidence (normally distributed data), and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for sensitivity, metacognitive sensitivity, and efficiency (non-normal data);
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; confidence: p values for the comparison between tasks p= 0.037; sensitivity: p values testing the difference with chance
level, for certainty p= 0.0011/honesty, p= 0.012; comparison between tasks, p= 0.01; metacognitive sensitivity (0.0004/0.034/0.026); metacognitive
efficiency (0.0004/0.01/0.72). Source data are provided as a Source data file.
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Judgments about honesty are less stable and less precise that
judgments about certainty (Study 1). To evaluate the stability of
listeners’ judgments within each task, we employed a double-pass
consistency technique48,49: without the participants’ knowing, 10%
of the trials were presented twice in each task. This allowed us to
compute the percentage of times that participants provided the
same judgments for the same pair of stimuli within each task. As
can be seen in Fig. 2b, the percentage of agreement was high within
the same task. Participants provided the same judgments 69.9%
+/− 6.4 SD of the time in the certainty task and 66.3%+/− 9.3 SD
of the time in the honesty task, which was highly significantly above
chance (certainty: t(18)= 13, p < 0.001, d= 3.1; honesty: t(18)=
7.4, p < 0.001, d= 1.75). Within task, consistency was significantly
lower when judging honesty than when judging certainty (t(18)=
2.5, p= 0.02, d= 0.45). In addition, the percentage of agreement
was correlated across tasks: participants who were the most con-
sistent in the certainty task were also the most consistent in the
honesty task (Spearman’s rho= 0.69, p= 0.001, see Fig. SIV.A).
Finally, participants were more confident in their choices when they
provided converging (certainty: 0.12+/− 0.1 SD; honesty: 0.11
+/− 0.1 SD) as compared to diverging judgments (certainty: −0.17
+/− 0.16 SD; t(18)= 6.44, p < 0.001, d= 2.3; honesty: −0.17+/−
0.19 SD; t(18)= 4.6, p < 0.001, d= 1.89, see Fig. 2b).
We further verified the robustness of these findings with respect
to the response strategy of each individual by converting the values
of percentage of agreement into values of internal noise using a
signal-detection theory (SDT) model48,49 accounting for response
bias across intervals (see “Methods” and Fig. SIV.B). Internal noise
values for both tasks (M ± SD: honesty: M= 1.22+/− 0.76 SD,
certainty: M= 1.05+/− 0.66 SD; expressed in units of external
noise standard deviation) were consistent with both low-level
psychophysical tasks50 and high-level cognitive auditory tasks51.
We reached similar conclusions as with the percentage of
agreement: (i) internal noise was lower for certainty compared to
honesty (t(17)= 2.23, p= 0.04, d= 0.14, and (ii) these values were
correlated between both tasks (Spearman rho= 0.55, p= 0.02, Fig.
SIV.C), supporting the view that participants who were the most
consistent in the certainty task were also the most consistent in the
honesty task. It is unlikely that the observed effects stem from
differences in task engagement or instructions between tasks.
Rather, the present results point toward differences in terms of the
precision of the perceptual representations used by listeners to
perform each task, or alternatively, differential consistency in using
perceptual representations to make the judgments (see Study 2).
Overall, the findings show that the perceptual representations
guiding judgments in the two tasks are stable (e.g., internal noise
was equivalent to what can be observed in low-level perceptual
tasks) and that they largely overlap for the two tasks. Yet, they
also show that judgments about the certainty of a speaker are tied
to sensory evidence more than judgments about honesty. This
difference was further quantified by computing for each
participant and task a psychometric function relating their
decisions to the quantity of evidence available in each trial,
cumulated over the three acoustic dimensions (see Fig. 2c and
“Methods”). Sensitivity, corresponding to the slope of individuals’
psychometric functions, significantly differed from chance level in
both tasks with this cumulative measure (certainty: M=−0.12
+/− 0.13 SD, Z(18)= 14, p= 0.0011, d= 0.93; honesty: M=
−0.07+/− 0.1 SD, Z(18)= 33, p= 0.012, d= 0.7). Congruent
with the analyses of choice agreement and internal noise
presented above, sensitivity was lower in the honesty as compared
to the certainty task (Z(18)= 31, p= 0.01, d= 0.41).
Confidence in social perceptions of honesty and certainty
(Study 1). Consistent with this decreased precision, participants
were also less confident overall in their judgments about honesty
(M= 64.1+/− 12) as compared to certainty (M= 60.3+/− 10.3;
t(15)= 2.29, p= 0.037, d= 0.35, see Fig. 2d). This would be
expected if evaluating certainty can indeed reduce to identifying a
display (i.e., making a perceptual decision), while evaluating
honesty cannot.
To examine whether this decreased precision impacted
metacognitive sensitivity (i.e., the ability of participants to track
the reliability of their decisions through confidence judgments),
we computed an index of metacognitive sensitivity for each
participant in each task, by subtracting the slope of the
psychometric functions built for high-confidence judgments from
the slope obtained for low-confidence judgments52 (see “Meth-
ods”). Metacognitive sensitivity was significantly above chance
level in both tasks (certainty: M= 0.28+/− 0.7, Z(15)= 0, p <
0.001, d= 0.55; honesty: M= 0.07+/− 0.11, Z(15)= 27, p=
0.034, d= 0.7, see Fig. 2d and Fig. SV.A for details per acoustic
dimensions), but it was higher in the certainty as compared to the
honesty task (Z(15)= 25, p= 0.026, d= 0.43). As mentioned
above, sensitivity was also lower in the honesty task, which could
underlie this difference at the metacognitive level. To assess
participants’ ability to evaluate their decisions while considering
their underlying sensitivity, we thus computed a last index of
metacognitive efficiency (see Fig. 2d and “Methods”). Metacog-
nitive efficiency was above chance level in both tasks (certainty:
M= 1.3+/− 2.2, Z(15)= 0, p < 0.001, d= 0.58; honesty: M=
0.66+/− 0.8, Z(15)= 19, p= 0.011, d= 0.82), and there was no
significant difference in between the two tasks (Z(15)= 61, p >
0.7, d= 0.4). Thus participants were capable of evaluating the
reliability of their decisions when judging which of two voices was
more certain and when judging which of two voices was more
dishonest. Although we observed decreased sensitivity in the
honesty task, results at the level of metacognitive efficiency show
that listeners could still evaluate the adequacy of their decisions
with respect to sensory evidence. In addition, as was the case for
the percentage of agreement and internal noise, participants’
metacognitive efficiency was correlated across the two tasks
(Spearman’s rho= 0.53, p= 0.034, see Fig. SIV.D). Thus
participants who showed higher metacognitive efficiency in one
of the tasks also tended to show higher metacognitive efficiency in
the other task, in line with previous reports showing that
individuals’ levels of metacognitive efficiency correlate across
different tasks53.
In summary, Study 1 reveals that a common perceptual
representation supports both social perceptions of certainty and
honesty from speech: despite idiosyncratic strategies, there is a
close similarity between the reverse correlation kernels obtained
along three acoustic dimensions for social perceptions of honesty
and certainty (Fig. 1), and a high degree of agreement in between
the two tasks (Fig. 2). In addition, our results show that
judgments about the certainty of a speaker are more stable and
precise than judgments about the honesty of a speaker in a task
that forces participants to rely on speech prosody only. This
suggests that, while judgments about the certainty of a speaker
from speech prosody can essentially reduce to perceptual
decisions, judgments about honesty can hardly be reduced to
perceptual decisions and, as suggested by research on deception
detection2,3, may critically depend on additional contextual
information.
Impact of individual decisional biases and situational context
on the interpretation of the common prosodic signature (Study
2A). To examine the hypothesis that judgments about certainty
and honesty rely on a common prosodic signature at a perceptual
level, but differ in terms of their reliance on additional, contextual
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information, we ran a second study. Two separate groups of
French-speaking participants heard spoken pseudo-words that
were acoustically manipulated to reproduce the prosodic sig-
natures discovered in the first study. They had to rate how much
they thought that a speaker was lying (N= 20, 9 females) or was
certain (N= 20, 12 females) on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 7
in two tasks where contextual information allowing to infer the
speakers’ incentives were now accessible. Note that—unlike the
forced choice procedure used in Study 1—such absolute ratings
reflect a mixture of listeners’ perceptual sensitivity (how attuned
to sensory evidence their choices are), the contribution of other
acoustical variables (e.g., voice timbre) and cognitive inferences
based on these cues (e.g., speaker identity or gender), as well as
individual decisional biases (listeners general tendency to report
that someone is certain or honest). To construct the stimuli, we
applied the average three-dimensional (pitch, loudness, duration)
prosodic contours of certainty, honesty, doubt, and lie (i.e., ± the
dynamic kernels) inferred from Study 1, each with three different
strengths (i.e., three different gain values; see “Methods”), to eight
pseudo-words pronounced by two different speakers (same ori-
ginal recordings as in Study 1).
Crucially, a context now provided information about speakers’
potential incentives: for certainty, participants were told that the
spoken words were responses recorded from other participants
who previously performed a task with various levels of difficulty,
and that they were to judge whether these participants were
confident in their response or not. For the honesty task, they were
told that their task was to judge whether previous participants
engaging in a deceitful poker game were lying (i.e., bluffing) or
not. Thus participants rated the same stimuli in both tasks, but in
one task the framing enforced an interpretation in terms of
genuine expressions of certainty, while in the other task the
framing suggested that the speakers would sometimes be deceitful
and sometimes not. This procedure allowed us 1) to examine the
impact of individual decisional biases and contextual factors on
the interpretation of the prosodic signatures derived through our
reverse correlation method in the first study, and 2) to test the
hypothesis that providing listeners with a context can sway their
interpretations of these displays when the speaker is likely to be
deceitful, while it does not in the case of certainty.
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (rmANOVA) includ-
ing z-scored ratings as a dependent variable revealed a main effect
of prosody (F(3,114)= 12.2, p < 0.001, ηp2= 0.2) and an interac-
tion between task and prosody (F(3,114)= 24.8, p < 0.001, ηp2=
0.34), showing that introducing different contexts impacted
participants interpretation of the displays. There was also a triple
interaction between strength, prosody, and task (F(3,114)= 18, p
< 0.001, ηp2= 0.07), reflecting the fact that participants’ ratings
varied linearly with the strength of the archetype in the certainty
task but not in the honesty task (see Fig. SVI.A).
In the certainty task, where the context enforced a canonical
interpretation of the prosodic displays, we confirmed the
hypothesis of a common perceptual representation in a distinct
sample of participants, in that the archetypes derived from
judgments of certainty and judgments of honesty (in the first
study) were judged similarly (Figs. 3a and SVIA): certain and
honest prosodies were perceived as more certain than lying and
doubtful prosodies for every level of strength (all p values <0.001,
z-values >5, post hoc Tukey honestly significant difference (HSD)
with Bonferroni correction, d ranging from 1.8 for gain= 1, to
2.96 for gain= 3, see Fig. SVIA for the detail for each levels of
gain). This is consistent with the hypothesis that listeners
interpret this common prosodic signature as a reflection of
speaker’s reliability.
The findings also confirmed that judgments about honesty
entail more complex inferences and larger inter-individual
variability than judgments about certainty. In the honesty task,
the magnitude of the effect was much reduced at the group level,
and the strength of the transformation had a non-linear effect on
judgments. Doubtful prosodies were perceived as more dishonest
than honest prosodies for intermediate (p < 0.01, z > 4, d= 0.83)
and high levels of strength (p < 0.01, z > 4, d= 0.54), and more
dishonest than certain prosodies for intermediate levels of
strength (p < 0.01, z= 4.4, d= 0.65). By contrast, judgments were
not significantly different between lying prosodies and honest or
certain prosodies at the group level (p values >0.2, z-values <4, all
d < 0.52, other comparisons were non-significant after Bonferroni
correction).
As can be seen in Fig. 3a, this lack of significance at the level of
the group was due to increased inter-individual differences in the
honesty task. In the certainty task, there was little inter-individual
variability: 17 (10 females) out of 20 participants gave
significantly higher ratings for honest and certain archetypes as
compared to lying and doubtful archetypes (according to paired t
test on individual data with a significant threshold of p= 0.05),
no participant provided significantly lower ratings for honest/
certain prosodies, and 3 participants did not significantly
discriminate between the stimuli. By contrast, 8 (1 female) out
of the 20 participants who had to judge whether speakers were
lying provided significantly higher ratings for lying/doubtful
archetypes than for honest/certain archetypes (i.e., the canonical
interpretation), while 7 (4 females) participants presented the
opposite pattern, reporting that the speaker was lying upon
perceiving canonical displays of reliability (certain/honest pro-
sodies), which suggests that they expected deceitful speakers to
fake reliability in this context where bluffing was expected to
occur (5 participants did not significantly discriminate between
the stimuli, 4 females).
Thus, judgments about certainty were consistently tied to
sensory evidence, but judgments about dishonesty were not.
Comparing the absolute difference between ratings given for
reliable (honest/certain) versus unreliable (lying/doubtful) arche-
types between the two tasks revealed no significant difference in
the magnitude of the effect however (t(38)= 1.7, p= 0.1, d=
0.57), showing that listeners also largely rely on prosody to make
their judgments in the honesty task. Yet, the direction in which
individuals interpreted the prosodic signature varied, which
reveals that providing listeners with details about speakers’
probable incentives (i.e., to naturally express their confidence or
potentially fake it) sways listeners interpretation of the display.
Below, we investigate several factors that may explain this large
inter-individual variability in the interpretation of the prosodic
signature in the honesty task (also see Fig. SVII.A).
Relationship between perception and conceptual knowledge
(Study 2B). Next, we wanted to determine how listeners’ per-
ception of epistemic prosody relates to their conceptual knowl-
edge. To this end, after they completed the rating task (Study 2A),
we asked participants to explicitly report their conceptual
knowledge about epistemic prosody, for instance, by stating
whether they thought that someone who is certain would speak
loudly or quietly. There were six questions in total, targeting the 3
acoustic dimensions of pitch, loudness, and duration, each at a
static (e.g., high pitch or low pitch) or dynamic (rising or falling
intonation) level.
In sharp contrast with what was observed at the perceptual
level, there was no clear consensus among participants at the
conceptual level regarding most aspects under study (see Fig. SVI.
B). The only aspects for which the distribution of participant’s
responses differed significantly from chance associated lower
mean pitch to certainty (X2= 22.5, p < 0.001), higher mean pitch
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to lies (X2= 19.6, p < 0.001), and higher loudness to certainty
(X2= 10, p < 0.004; no effect for lies (X2= 0.9, p= 0.44). Thus,
although participants rely on canonical prosodic signatures
integrating intonation, loudness, and duration to judge whether
a voice is lying or doubting, most of the knowledge upon which
these judgments rest is not explicitly available to them.
Strikingly, as with the results obtained in the listening tests,
there was a strong association between responses given for
certainty and honesty at the explicit level (see Fig. SVII.B).
Agreement between responses was significantly above chance for
five of the six dimensions (mean agreement for loudness: M=
72.5% +/− 44, t(39)= 3.15, p < 0.004, d= 0.5; duration: M=
75% +/− 43, t(39)= 3.6, p < 0.001, d= 0.57; pitch: M= 87.5%
+/− 33, t(39)= 7, p < 0.0001, d= 1.13; loudness variations: M=
82.5% +/− 38, t(39)= 5.34, p < 0.0001, d= 0.85; duration
variations: M= 85% +/− 36, t(39)= 6.12, p < 0.0001, d= 0.98;
agreement was not significantly different from chance level for
intonation: M= 62.5% +/− 48, t(39)= 1.6, p= 0.11, d= 0.26).
Thus, participants also had common representations regarding
lying and doubtful prosodies at the conceptual level, although the
content of these representations differed from one individual to
the next.
To examine whether this knowledge related to their perception
of epistemic prosodies, we split the ratings depending on
participants’ responses to the six questions. As can be seen on
Fig. 3b, participants’ conceptual knowledge was only weakly
associated with their perceptual judgments overall. In the
certainty task, none of the aspects assessed at the conceptual
level interacted with the effect of prosody type on ratings in an
rmANOVA (all p values >0.18, F < 1.7, ηp2 < 0.02). In the honesty
task, conceptual knowledge about speed interacted with the effect
of prosody type on ratings (F(3,39)= 7.08, p= 0.0007, ηp2=
0.29), but none of the other aspects did (all p values >0.3, F > 1.1;
ηp2 < 0.05). This impact of concepts about speed on ratings also
interacted with listeners’ gender as we report in Fig. SVII.A,
suggesting two potential mediators of the different interpretations
of the display observed in the second study: concepts and
identities.
Finally, there were no relationships between participants’
convergence in the two tasks at the conceptual and perceptual
Fig. 3 Relationship between perceptual and conceptual knowledge (study 2B). a Normalized (z-scored) ratings in the certainty (top, blue; N= 20) and
honesty (bottom, green; N= 20) tasks for each participant and prosody type (shown by different hues). Bar plots represent individual participants’ mean
normalized ratings for each prosodic archetype, with error bars showing the 95% confidence interval. Data were sorted by effect magnitude. Squared
markers below the plot show the listener’s gender (black: female; gray: male). Asterisks show the results of paired two-sided sample t tests comparing
reliable versus unreliable prosodies for each individual listener, with *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (individual p values are reported in the Source data
file). At the level of the group, in the certainty task, both honest and certain prosodies were judged as more certain than doubtful (honest: p < 0.001
Bonferroni corrected post hoc Tukey HSD, d= 3.72; certain: p < 0.001, d= 4.14) and lying (honest: p < 0.001, d= 3.23; certain: p < 0.001, d= 3.72)
prosodies. In the honesty task, greater inter-individual differences were observed (see detailed report in the main text). b Normalized ratings were split
depending on participants’ responses at the explicit questions assessing their conceptual knowledge about epistemic prosody, which revealed that the
relationship between prosody type and ratings did not vary with participants’ conceptual knowledge about certainty and honesty in general, with the
exception of concepts about speed in the honesty task (shown by the green asterisk that represent the significant interaction between concepts about
speed and prosody type on ratings of honesty). Data are presented as mean values with error bars showing the 95% confidence interval. Triple asterisks
(***) show the significant results of the rmANOVA testing the interaction between concepts about speed and prosody in the honesty task, with normalized
ratings as a dependent variable, p= 0.0007 (all other interactions were not significant). Source data and exact individual p values for a are provided as a
Source data file.
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levels (see Fig. SVII.C): the degree to which participants’ ratings
converged in the two rating tasks did not relate to the degree to
which their concepts about the two attitudes converged. Overall,
the results show that social perceptions of certainty and honesty
based on speech prosody largely rely on procedural rather than
declarative knowledge.
Language specificity (Study 3). If this prosodic signature of
unreliability stems from physiological reactions associated with
cognitive effort, rather than from culturally learned conventions,
we should expect that it should be perceived cross-
linguistically23,29. Contrary to cross-cultural perception of vocal
emotions, which has received a large amount of attention over the
past decades54, past studies on prosodic signatures of certainty
and honesty examined only one language and attitude at
once13,14,43,46 or compared the expression or perception of cer-
tainty or honesty across languages without actually testing whe-
ther these attitudes can be recognized cross-linguistically43,55.
Only one study indirectly tested whether a composite attitude of
doubt/incredulity (coarsely defined as a “feeling of being uncer-
tain or of not believing something”) can be perceived across
languages in Japanese, French, and English speakers from speech
prosody alone, by relying on an elicitation procedure involving
real utterances recorded in the three languages separately by
trained speakers56. Findings suggested an in-group advantage in
recognizing doubt-incredulity, but no acoustic analysis of the
stimuli was provided, which prevented the identification of the
common prosodic signature underlying these judgments. More-
over, as detailed above, elicitation procedures are not optimal to
investigate perception per se, because of a number of confounds
that are particularly problematic when investigating cross-cultural
issues57 (e.g., it is difficult to know what is actually being encoded
by the speaker). Thus it remains unknown whether prosodic
signatures of reliability can be perceived across languages.
In order to examine this issue, we tested two additional groups
of English (N= 22) and Spanish (N= 21) native speakers who
had no exposure to French on the same certainty task as Study 2.
As can be seen on Fig. 4, English, Spanish, and French listeners
rated the stimuli in the same way. An rmANOVA including the
three language groups (French, English, and Spanish) revealed a
main effect of prosody on ratings (F(3,180)= 135.5, p < 0.001,
ηp2= 0.69), no effect of native language (F(2, 60)= 1, p > 0.37,
ηp2 < 0.001), and no interaction (F(6,180)= 1.4, p > 0.2, ηp2=
0.045). Post hoc test revealed that participants judged honest and
certain prosody to be more certain than lying and doubtful
prosodies in every language group (all p values <0.001 Bonferroni
corrected Tukey HSD and all d > 2.2).
In addition, to examine whether language exposure impacts the
perception of the prosodic signatures, we tested an additional
group of 12 speakers from various languages (German, Dutch,
Russian, Marathi, Polish, Japanese, Mandarin Chinese, Swedish)
who had various levels of exposure to French. These participants
rated the stimuli similarly as the previous groups (see Fig. SVIII.
A), and their level of spoken French comprehension was not
correlated with their evaluations of the prosodic signatures
(Pearson rho=−0.27, p > 0.39, see Fig. SVIII.B and “Methods”).
We also reached the same conclusions in the group of English,
Spanish, and multi-language speakers regarding the relationship
between percepts and concepts (see Fig. SVIII.C): concepts and
percepts were largely decoupled, with the only exception that
concepts about speed somewhat determined judgments about
honesty. As was the case for the group of French participants,
there was little consensus at the conceptual level for most aspects:
participants did not significantly favor one or the other option for
pitch, speed, and intonation (all p values > 0.1). The only
significant association concerned loudness: participants were
more likely to report that a certain voice is louder than a
doubtful one.
Overall, these results demonstrate the language independence
of a core prosodic signature that underlies both judgments of
certainty and honesty. Research has shown that many vocal
emotions can be perceived across languages but that there are
substantial in-group advantages54. Here we find no in-group
advantage regarding the perception of reliability in speech, which
is consistent with the hypothesis that this prosodic signature
reflects natural associations, and is tied to physiological reactions
of cognitive effort, rather than culturally learned communicative
conventions. Notably, in-group advantages in recognizing vocal
emotions increase as cultural and linguistic distance increases54,
so future research should aim to test remotely related groups
rather than Indo-European native speakers. Of particular interest
for future research is whether this pattern of results would hold
for native speakers of tonal languages58 and for native speakers of
the few languages that do not conform to the default mode of
speech production whereby most utterances present falling
intonation and volume (e.g., in languages or dialects where rising
Fig. 4 Cross-linguistic validation for the certainty task including the
group of French speakers (N= 20), a group of native English speakers
(N= 22), and a group of Spanish speakers (N= 21). Normalized ratings
(z-scored) were averaged separately for each prosodic archetype and
language group. Data are presented as mean values with error bars
showing the 95% confidence interval. Crosses represent individual data for
each prosodic archetype and native language. As was the case in the group
of French speakers, Spanish and English speakers perceived certain/honest
archetypes to be more certain than doubt/lies archetypes (see main text
for details). They also judged certain prosody to be more certain than
honest prosodies (p < 0.005, N= 21 Spanish speakers: d= 0.4; N= 22
English speakers: d= 0.7) and lying prosodies to be more certain than
doubtful prosodies (p < 0.001, Spanish: d= 0.7; English: d= 0.8), showing
the same sensitivity to small variations in the gain of the archetypes. Source
data are provided as a Source data file.
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intonations are frequently used in statements)23. Finally, it may
be that in-group advantages are linked to a better familiarity with
the utterances carrying the prosodic signatures, as studies finding
in-group advantages typically use real words/utterances. An open
question is thus whether in-group advantages would emerge in a
similar study involving real words/utterances rather than pseudo-
words.
Impact of the common prosodic signature on verbal working
memory (Study 3). To clarify the automaticity and cognitive
depth at which this prosodic signature is processed, we ran a last
study involving an implicit memorization paradigm. Forty par-
ticipants (the same group of French speakers as Study 2) had to
memorize pseudo-words that—unbeknown to them—had vary-
ing prosodies corresponding to the archetypes of doubtful, cer-
tain, lying, and honest prosodies that were found through reverse
correlation in Study 1. Trials consisted of a sequence of six
spoken words, followed by three pseudo-words presented on the
screen. Participants had to recognize which of these three written
pseudo-words had been presented in the preceding auditory
sequence. As in Study 2, the prosody of each spoken pseudo-word
was precisely manipulated in order to reproduce the signatures of
honesty and certainty found in the first study (see “Methods” and
Fig. 5a). Note that in order to measure implicit effects, Study 3
was actually conducted before Study 2, at a point where partici-
pants were not told about speech prosody or social attitudes at all.
This procedure allowed us to test whether the prosodic signatures
would be extracted by listeners, and automatically impact
their verbal working memory despite the fact that they were task-
irrelevant.
Two opposite predictions can be made as to how epistemic
prosody may impact verbal working memory. On the one hand, it
may be that listeners automatically filter out information if it is
pronounced with an unreliable prosody: in this case, unreliable
prosodies may impair memorization. On the other hand, it may
be that unreliable prosodies function as attentional attractors
ensuring the detection of deception: in this case, unreliable
prosodies may boost memorization. Regardless of the direction of
the effect, any found impact of the prosody of spoken words on
memory would constitute evidence that an automatic extraction
of the prosodic signatures has occurred.
To discriminate between these alternatives, a mixed hierarch-
ical logistic regression was carried out to assess the impact of
target position (1–6), prosody type (certain/doubt or honesty/lie),
and prosody reliability (reliable or unreliable) on the accuracy
(correct or incorrect response) of participants’ recall. There was a
main effect of reliability on performances (X2= 7.5, b=−0.05
+/− 0.02 sem, z=−2.7, p < 0.01), but, consistent with Study 1
and 2, no effect of type (X2= 0.03, p > 0.8) and no interaction
between type and reliability (X2= 0.63, p > 0.4). This is consistent
with our finding that a common prosodic signature supports
social perceptions of both certainty and honesty. We therefore
collated the data for certain/honest and lie/doubt for the rest of
this analysis.
Overall, words pronounced with unreliable prosodies were
memorized better than reliable ones (reliable: mean d’= 1.68
+/− 0.46 SD, unreliable: d’ 1.8+/− 0.46, t(39)=−2.7, p= 0.01,
d= 0.26), and participants responded faster in this condition
(reliable: mean RTs= 3.72+/− 0.55 SD, unreliable: 3.67+/−
0.54, t(39)= 2.31, p= 0.026, d= 0.1, see Fig. 5b). There was also
a main effect of position on accuracy reflecting a typical recency
effect (X2= 653, b= 0.29+/− 0.02 sem, z= 14.3, p < 0.0001),
but this effect did not interact with reliability (i.e., reliability
remained better for unreliable prosodies at every position, X2=
1.2, p > 0.2, see Fig. 5c). Participants were also more confident in
their memories when the target was pronounced with an
Fig. 5 Automatic impact of the common prosodic signature on verbal working memory (study 3). a Design of the memorization task. Participants heard
six spoken pseudo-words before having to recognize a target pseudo-word presented along with two distractors. Unbeknown to the participant, the spoken
targets were pronounced with the archetypes of prosodies derived from Study 1 and were either reliable (certain or honest) or unreliable (lie or doubt),
while the prosody of the five spoken distractors was randomly picked from the same pool of stimuli, ensuring equal saliency of the target and distractors.
bMain results of the memory task. Differences (Δ) between d’ (left), response times (middle) and confidence (right) for reliable minus unreliable prosodic
archetypes. Data are presented as mean values with error bars showing the 95% confidence interval. Dots show individual data. Unreliable prosodies were
memorized better and faster than reliable prosodies and were associated with more confident ratings. Black asterisks show the results of the two-sided
paired t tests comparing reliable and unreliable prosodies, with **p= 0.01; *p < 0.05; d’: p= 0.01; response times: p= 0.026; confidence: p= 0.035.
c Recency effect. Top: accuracy (top left) and confidence (top right) for reliable (light gray) and unreliable (dark gray) prosodic archetypes as a function of
the position of the target within the audio stream. Bottom: differences between reliable minus reliable prosodic archetypes (black). There was no main
interaction between position and prosody for accuracy, but the impact of prosody on confidence judgments interacted with target position such that recent
unreliable targets lead to increased confidence. Data are presented as mean values with error bars showing the 95% confidence interval; *p < 0.05; **p=
0.01. Source data are provided as a Source data file.
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unreliable as compared to a reliable prosody (reliable: mean
confidence= 3.3+/− 0.37 SD, unreliable: 3.34+/− 0.34,
t(39)=−2.18, p= 0.035, d= 0.11; there were no significant
differences in metacognitive efficiency in between the two tasks,
see supplementary information). Contrary to what was observed
for accuracy, the effect of prosody on confidence interacted with
the position of the target: a mixed hierarchical linear regression
revealed both a main effect of reliability (X2= 6.32, b=−0.02
+/− 0.009 sem, t=−2.1, p= 0.04) and position on confidence
(X2= 1090, b= 0.14+/− 0.014 sem, t= 10.1, p < 0.0001) and an
interaction between position and reliability (X2= 4.55, b= 0.009
+/− 0.004 sem, t= 2.2, p= 0.033). Thus, when the target was
present earlier in the stream, prosody boosted memorization but
this beneficial effect remained inaccessible to metacognition (i.e.,
no change in confidence ratings). Given previous reports showing
that performance but not confidence is impacted by uncon-
sciously accumulated information59, this result suggests that the
effect of prosody on recall in these trials resulted from
unconscious influences.
Note that it is unlikely that this effect entails a social evaluation of
the honesty or certainty of the speaker per se, since social attitudes
were totally irrelevant in this task. Rather, the results suggest that
the prosodic signature of unreliability automatically impacts verbal
working memory, consistent with the idea that it reflects a rare
regime of speech production that “pops-out” against typical
(effortless, or neutral) prosody14, thereby attracting attention in
an exogenous fashion. Further research testing whether this effect
extends to non-speech sounds could establish the level of processing
at which this acoustic signature is prioritized, and whether it
occupies a dedicated niche in the acoustic landscape, and triggers
increased alertness regardless of the type of sound that carries it, as
recently shown for roughness60.
Discussion
In four studies, we find converging evidence that a common,
“core” signature supports social evaluations about the honesty
and certainty of a speaker from speech prosody. The perceptual
representations uncovered through reverse correlation for these
two types of judgments are strikingly similar (Study 1): speakers
are perceived to be unreliable (i.e., uncertain or dishonest) if they
pronounce words with a rising intonation, less intensity at the
beginning of the word, a slower speech rate, and more variable
pitch and speech rate.
Crucially, listeners judged the same pairs of spoken pseudo-
words similarly for both attitudes (Study 1), separate groups of
listeners from various languages rated certain/honest and lying/
doubtful archetypes similarly, these judgments were largely
independent from listeners concepts about honest and certain
prosodies (Study 2 and 3), and the core prosodic signature
automatically impacted verbal working memory (Study 4). By
testing the sharedness of these representations over social atti-
tudes and languages, as well as their independence on conceptual
knowledge and automaticity, we provide a direct empirical test of
the hypothesis according to which this prosodic signature carries
“natural” rather than culturally learned, language dependent
“conventional” meaning22,23. As such, the results also question
the assumption that social attitudes such as certainty should be
contrasted with emotions in that—contrary to the latter—they
primarily rely on controlled and culture dependent processes29.
An open question concerning this common prosodic signature
is whether it is intrinsically communicative (i.e., a genuine signal
that has evolved to affect receivers in particular ways, with
receivers having evolved mechanisms to be affected by this very
signal), or rather, constitute a natural sign or cue (i.e., a char-
acteristic of the senders receivers can draw inferences from)21,22.
The perceptual representations that we uncovered here with a
data-driven method are strikingly similar to the actual con-
sequences of cognitive effort on speech production23,30. Research
has also shown that speakers produce this prosodic signature
constitutively as a function of their certainty and competence,
even in the absence of an audience18,19, which questions the view
that it is fundamentally communicative18,21. Taken together,
these findings suggest that, at a fundamental level, this prosodic
signature constitutes a natural sign (or a cue) rather than a
signal22,61: it can be interpreted by listeners, but its primary
function is not to communicate. These displays may thus work
like shivers, that are expressed naturally when one is cold, but can
also be deliberately shown to ostensibly communicate that one is
cold22.
In Study 4, we find that perceiving these displays automatically
impacts working memory. Combined with the results obtained in
Study 1, this shows that human listeners are equipped with
mental representations allowing them to automatically detect
prosodic signatures of unreliability that would be naturally pro-
duced when a speaker experiences more effort, thereby revealing
a particularly adaptive mechanism on the side of receivers. An
important open question for future research will be to understand
the origin of this mechanism. It is possible that listeners learn
what this prosodic signature naturally means by observing social
partners, and registering associations between specific prosodic
manifestations and speakers’ reliability, attested independently
via reasoning, or by observing other signs of cognitive effort (e.g.,
facial expressions, gestures…). Alternatively, this signature may
be part of a more ancient system shaped through evolutionary
pressures. Future research involving pre-verbal infants and non-
human primates could shed light on this issue. For instance,
recent research suggests that toddlers already have biases to focus
on similar prosodic markers in child-directed-speech and that
this may be associated with better learning62.
Importantly, speakers can also manipulate these natural signs
deliberately during communication. A prosodic display suggestive
of reliability (e.g., falling pitch and volume, faster speech rate) can
be observed when a cooperative speaker naturally displays it, or
deliberately shows it to signal certainty or to persuade14,16, but it
can also be faked by a deceitful speaker in a coercive way2,21. An
important consequence of this flexibility is that there should be—
in practice—no mandatory prosodic marker of dishonesty, as
research analyzing liars’ speech indeed suggests2,41, and thus that
perceiving a prosodic display suggestive of cognitive effort is not
strictly conclusive in itself, as it is also crucial to determine
whether the display was naturally or deliberately shown by the
speaker22.
Our findings are also compatible with inferential (or prag-
matic) views according to which evaluating the mental attitudes
of others not only depends on perceptual representations, but also
crucially, on additional inferential (mindreading) processes22,63,
in particular when it is crucial to rely on contextual information
and prior knowledge to infer speakers’ hidden intentions (i.e.,
when other information about the situation or the speaker suggest
that dishonesty is probable)2. Although we find converging evi-
dence for common representations at the perceptual level (similar
reverse correlation kernels obtained in a forced choice procedure
in Study 1, cross-validation in Study 2, similar implicit bias on
memory for archetypes of doubtful and dishonesty prosodies in
Study 3), we also find that judgments about (dis)honesty are less
tied to sensory evidence than judgments about certainty. Listeners
were less confident and precise in their decisions about (dis)
honesty when no context allowed them to infer the speaker’s
intention (Study 1), and important inter-individual differences
were observed for (dis)honesty in a rating task that allowed
participants to express individual decisional biases, and involved a
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context specifying that speakers’ were likely to be deceitful (Study
2A). Relatedly, a recent study found that listeners’ motivation to
understand a message does not impact their perception of pro-
sodic signatures of reliability per se, but influences how they
exploit them to evaluate the speaker’s message46. Thus, like other
types of vocal or facial expressions (e.g., smiles that can be
interpreted as affiliatory or ironic)63, at a pragmatic level listeners
interpret these prosodic signatures of reliability differently
depending on the context, and individual factors. This is com-
patible with inferential models of non-verbal communication22,
where it could be said that non-arbitrary (natural) signs (here of
cognitive effort) have to be interpreted in a context dependent
manner to infer speakers’ meanings. Such a framework empha-
sizes the continuity between non-verbal ostensive communication
and linguistic communication, the crucial difference between
them being that the latter relies on conventional symbols rather
than natural signs61.
Research on deception detection has shown that observers are
relatively poor at detecting liars explicitly in laboratory
settings2,40. As mentioned above, this is partly explained by the
fact that liars have a relative control over their displays, with the
consequence that no behavioral cue to deceit is mandatory. Yet, it
has also been suggested that there is a dissociation between
explicit and implicit (or intuitive) abilities to detect lies2,3. While
observers may be quite good at picking up relevant cues uncon-
sciously (or intuitively), they may not always use them to overtly
and explicitly report dishonesty, in particular if they assess that
“the costs of failing to detect deception (are inferior to) those of
signaling distrust”3, or if they have been taught to rely on cues
that turn out to be unreliable such as gaze aversion2.
Consistent with these ideas, here we find that the prosodic
signature that is relevant to detect the dishonesty of a speaker is
extracted automatically (Study 4), and that percepts and concepts
about dishonest speech prosody largely dissociate (Study 2B).
Notably, in the first study where contextual and decisional factors
were neutralized in a forced-choice procedure, listeners’ sensi-
tivity to prosodic displays was highly significantly above chance
in the honesty task, with a large effect size. Although not directly
comparable, this contrasts with the medium to low effect sizes
found in a meta-analysis compiling average levels of accuracy in
explicit deception detection tasks (i.e., that reflect both observers’
sensitivity and their biases40). Finally, Study 2A shows that the
ability to express individual decisional biases in a context where
salient information about speakers’ intentions is available (e.g.,
that they are likely to be bluffing) sways listeners’ interpretation
of the prosodic signature in one way or the other, while judg-
ments about the certainty of the speaker remain strictly tied to
sensory evidence. Thus, although listeners possess automatic
mechanisms for detecting the prosodic signature of unreliability,
they interpret this display differently depending on the context,
individual factors, and, to a lesser extent, their concepts about
epistemic prosody. A promising venue for future research will be
to combine our data-driven psychophysical method with specific
manipulations of the context known to modulate the cost of
exposing deceit3, or the exploitation of prosodic information to
evaluate a speaker’s message46, to examine whether—as suggested
by Study 2—these factors impacts decisional biases and con-
textualized inferences rather than perceptual sensitivity to pro-
sodic features. In addition, given that our method allows a very
fine description of the representations used by listeners to detect
unreliability, it will be interesting in the future to directly com-
pare these representations with speech produced in various nat-
uralistic conditions, to precisely examine the extent to which the
perception and production of unreliable speech overlap, and
assess how accurate and sensitive to the context listeners are.
Overall, we found weak links between perceptual and con-
ceptual knowledge in our participants. Strikingly, the only
acoustic dimension for which perceptual and conceptual levels
seemed to relate was speech rate. Response times are known to be
flexibly associated with certainty depending on the speed accu-
racy tradeoff64, and observers rely on their own experience with a
task to map the latency of other agents’ responses to subjective
metacognitive states65. Thus it may be that only those acoustic
features that do not consistently vary with reliability, and there-
fore require more flexible assessments, are represented at the
conceptual level. We also note that the loose association between
percepts and concepts found here is in sharp contrast with recent
studies in the visual domain suggesting a match between indivi-
duals’ conceptual knowledge about emotions, and their percep-
tual representations of facial expressions exposed with a similar
reverse correlation approach66. This discrepancy could stem from
the fact that we investigated attitudinal rather than emotional
displays here, or from slight differences in the procedures used to
evaluate participants’ conceptual knowledge; alternatively, it may
reveal a genuine difference between auditory and visual mod-
alities, a possibility worth investigating in further research.
In line with a bulk of data showing differences in how males and
females process emotional and attitudinal prosody20 and differ
regarding their levels of empathy67, and tendencies to lie68 and
detect lies69, we found substantial gender differences in this study
(see Figs. SIII and SVII.A). Interestingly, gender differences were
limited to explicit judgments (Study 1 and 2) while at the implicit
level there were no differences between males and females (Study 3).
In the second study, females were more likely to interpret certain/
honest prosodies as faked displays when the context suggested that
speakers could be deceitful (i.e., bluffing). This is consistent with
research showing that females engage further neural processing
upon hearing conflicting signatures to speakers’ certainty17 and
reports documenting gender differences in deception detection69.
Whether the differences we observed here are linked to gender
per se, rather than other related factors such as empathic or anxiety
traits, remains unclear given recent results showing that empathy
and anxiety mediate gender differences in the neural processing of
prosodic signatures of certainty20. Studies involving bigger sample
sizes and specifically designed to address this issue are needed to
further understand how gender, other personal traits, as well as
socialization and personal experiences, relate to the interpretation of
(un)reliable prosodic displays. Relatedly, recent research involving
twins showed that face impressions of trustworthiness are mostly
determined by personal experiences rather than genes or shared
environments70.
Here we could not examine how phrasal prosody and word
meaning interact with the prosodic signature that we observed:
because we were interested in uncovering generic and language
independent effects, our procedure involved isolated pseudo-
words. Yet, previous research based on naturalistic speech has
shown that certainty is mostly reflected in the prosody used to
pronounce target words (i.e., words concerned by the epistemic
marking, generally at the end of the utterance14), and that social
evaluations made on isolated words and sentences strongly cor-
relate, and do not depend upon semantic content71, which sug-
gests that our findings would generalize to real spoken words
embedded in discourse. This being said, it would be interesting to
use our method, which allows a very fine-grained description of
listeners’ representations, to investigate how exactly phrasal and
linguistic aspects of prosody interact with markers of reliability in
speech. Another potential extension of this study would be to
examine other acoustic features that have previously been asso-
ciated with certainty and/or cognitive effort, such as measures of
voice quality14,30.
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A final open question concerns the finding that unreliable
prosodies were memorized better than reliable ones in Study 3.
This result shows that unreliable prosodies increase encoding in
short-term memory, potentially through an alerting mechanism,
in line with models suggesting that socially salient words should
be encoded better because they capture attention72. Yet, although
this privileged encoding of unreliable prosodies can be beneficial
in the short term (e.g., enabling listeners to detect dishonesty), it
would be rather detrimental in the long term (e.g., leading to
memorizing unreliable information). Thus further research
should test the impact of epistemic prosody on long-term
retention, and its relation with the short-term, working memory
effect that we observed here.
In conclusion, here we uncover a core, language-independent
prosodic signature that acts as an attention-grabbing marker of
(un)reliability, and on the basis of which various types of social
evaluations, such as judgments about the certainty or honesty of a
speaker, can be contextually constructed. Our results add to the
growing body of evidence suggesting that, contrary to decades of
research arguing that humans are highly gullible, dedicated
mechanisms actually allow us to detect unreliability in our social
partners efficiently3,6. Our findings disentangle the contribution
of perception, concepts, and (meta)cognition to epistemic vigi-
lance in the context of speech perception, and reveal that it also
relies on implicit mechanisms that enable the quick and efficient
detection of displays suggestive of unreliability, thereby com-
plementing prevailing ideas advocated in the literature that
emphasize the importance of reasoning and explicit aspects1,6.
These findings also have the potential to lead to several applica-
tions, for instance, to investigate metacognition and selective
learning in pre-verbal population5,11 or to develop light tools in
the context of forensic practices73. More generally, our findings
highlight the critical role played by audition for epistemic vigi-
lance. This has important implications at the numeric age, where
information heavily transits in written forms on the internet, and
suggests that at least some of the tools enabling epistemic vigi-
lance may not be adaptive anymore in the modern world74.
Methods
Study 1
Participants. Twenty (11 females, mean age= 22.6 years+/− 3.2) French listeners
participated in the first study that included two testing sessions separated by
1 week. Sample size was determined a priori based on a recent study using the same
methodology26. Participants were recruited via the INSEAD pool, and most of
them were students, so the sample was not very diverse in terms of socio-economic
background (socio-economic background was not systematically collected in this
study, but participants were recruited from the same pool of participants as Study
2/4 so we can assume a similar distribution as the one we report below). All
participants reported having no hearing impairments, they were native speakers of
French. One participant had to be excluded because he did not attend the second
session. In addition, three participants did not use the confidence scale reliably (i.e.,
two participants reported the same rating >75% of the time out of 100 possible
values, and one participant used <10% of the scale, oscillating around the mid-
point) and were therefore excluded for the analysis concerning confidence judg-
ments (similar results were obtained in the full group regarding most analysis,
except for the computation of metacognitive sensitivity since sigmoid curves for
high- and low-confidence trials could not be reliably fitted for these outlying
participants). Participants signed a consent form and were remunerated for their
participation. Ethical approval was obtained, and experimental data were collected
at INSEAD/ Sorbonne University Center for Behavioral Science.
Stimuli. Sounds were created with CLEESE, a voice transformation toolbox (https://
forum.ircam.fr/projects/detail/cleese/) that allows creating random fluctuations
around an audio file’s original contour of pitch, loudness, and duration75. Original
tokens were 10 bi-syllabic pseudo-words obeying phonotactic regularities of French
and using equally frequent syllables (bazin, bivan, bodou, dadon, dejon, dobue,
gibue, vagio, vevon, vizou) produced by a male and a female French speaker; they
therefore contained diverse phonetic contents that are representative of the pho-
notactic space of French, while remaining novel as they were created by combining
phonemes into novel pseudo-word forms that do not correspond to a real word in
French. Because this study focused on the perception of social attitudes rather than
social traits or personality impressions, we used only two voices (a male and a
female speaker). The pitch contour of initial recordings was artificially flattened and
normalized for loudness and duration (480 ms). We then transformed the stimuli by
randomly manipulating the pitch, loudness, and duration of the pseudo-words
independently in four consecutive windows of 120ms, by sampling five breaking
points values on a normal distribution (pitch: SD= 100 cents, clipped at +/−2.2
SD, loudness: SD= 1.7 dB, clipped at 2.2+ /- SD, duration: SD= 1.25 stretching
factor, clipped at +/−2.2 SD). These values were chosen so as to cover the range
observed in naturally produced utterances75 and linearly interpolated between
successive time points to ensure a naturally sounding transformation. Out of the 115
participants tested over the four studies, only 3 (including 1 German speaker who
was an expert in voice synthesis tested in the third study) spontaneously reported
that the voices were not natural exemplars but resynthesized voices during
debriefing, stating, for instance, that the voices sounded “robotic.”
Procedure. The order of the two experiments (certainty or honesty) was counter-
balanced across participants, and the directionality of the responses was inverted
across tasks: participants had to judge which of the two voices was the most certain
(confident) in one task, and which of the two voices seemed to be lying in the other
task, in order to avoid contagion effects. In each session, participants listened to
880 pairs of randomly modulated voices. After hearing the two sounds sequentially,
participants were asked to select one of the two stimuli. In the honesty task,
participants were asked to select the stimuli in which the speaker seemed to be
lying the most, while in the certainty task they were asked to select the stimuli in
which the speaker seemed to be the most confident (i.e., certain). Ten percent of
the stimuli were repeated twice to allow us to examine choice consistency (i.e.,
double pass consistency procedure48,49). Stimuli were presented in twenty blocks,
each containing a different speaker and pseudo-word. The order of presentation of
the blocks was pseudo-randomized for each participant so that blocks were
grouped per speaker (e.g., the first ten blocks corresponded to the female or male
speaker, with order counterbalanced across participants, and order of presentation
of the ten blocks containing different pseudo-words randomized for each partici-
pant). After making a choice, participants reported their confidence on a scale from
1 to 4. In order to keep the participants motivated in this long task, a fake score (a
random number taken from a uniform distribution ranging from 60 to 90%)
supposed to reflect performances was displayed at the end of each block and
participants were led to believe that financial compensation depended on their
performances. The task was coded using Matlab.
Reverse correlation analysis. Three reverse correlation kernels were computed for
each participant and each task by subtracting the mean pitch/loudness/duration of the
spoken words classified as certain (i.e., selected) or honest (i.e., not selected) from the
mean pitch/loudness/duration of the spoken words classified as doubtful (i.e., not
selected) or lies (i.e., selected). Note that, because the instructions were counter-
balanced in our two tasks (i.e., in the certainty task participants had to report which
prosody was reliable, while in the honesty task participants had to report which
prosody was unreliable), we reverse coded the values for the certainty task in order to
allow direct comparisons between the two tasks (i.e., we subtracted the values for
unchosen/honest voices from the values for chosen/lying voices). Individual kernels
were normalized by dividing them by the sum of their absolute values26 and averaged
for each task. This analysis was conducted directly on the five original breaking-point
values used to transform the original stimuli for duration (the last acoustic trans-
formation to be performed). For pitch and loudness, the original breaking-point
values may not exactly correspond to what the listeners heard, because the audio
manipulations were executed in a sequential order, so subsequent transformations
may have slightly altered the transposition that was intended originally. We thus ran
acoustic analysis in 12 consecutive windows to obtain fundamental frequencies and
root mean square (RMS) values for each stimulus, in order to remain as close as
possible to the pitch and loudness that were actually heard by the participants. The
impact of segment and task were assessed for each acoustic dimension by running
hierarchical linear mixed regressions including participant as a random factor with
the lmerTest package in R76.
Percentage of agreement. Agreement across tasks was computed for each partici-
pant as the correspondence between judgments given in the honesty task and
certainty task (e.g., agreement= 1 if for one pair of stimuli the participant per-
ceived the same stimuli to be more certain and less dishonest). Agreement within
task was computed for each participant by comparing responses given to repeated
pairs of stimuli (e.g., agreement= 1 if for one pair of repeated stimuli the parti-
cipant selected the same stimulus twice). Note that, although agreement can pro-
vide a coarse measure of choice consistency, it is prone to decision biases. To
account for these biases, we also used these values to estimate participants’ internal
noise in both tasks, following a procedure described below.
Confidence. Confidence ratings were z-scored and averaged separately for trials
where participants agreed or disagreed across the two tasks (Fig. 2a) or for trials
where participants agreed or disagreed within the same task (Fig. 2b).
Psychometric curves. Computation of summed area under the curve (sAUC). For
each trial, the sAUC is the sum of the areas under the curves corresponding to the
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differences between the normalized (i.e., z-scored per participant) dynamic profiles
of the first minus second stimuli, for each acoustic dimension (pitch, loudness, and
duration). Summing up the values of the AUC obtained for the three acoustic
dimensions gives us an estimate of the strength and directionality of the evidence
that was available to the participant in each trial. Values for loudness (RMS) were
reverse coded, because loudness varied in the opposite direction as compared to
pitch and duration (see Fig. 1). Psychometric curves were then constructed for each
participant and task by computing the response probability of choosing the first
stimulus in four bins depending on sAUC values and fitting sigmoid functions to
this data. Sensitivity was computed as the slope of individual psychometric curves.
Individual psychometric curves were also constructed for each level of confidence
separately (determined by a median split). Metacognitive sensitivity was then
computed as the difference in the absolute values of the slopes of the psychometric
curves computed for high- versus low-confidence trials52. Metacognitive efficiency
was then computed by dividing metacognitive sensitivity by the absolute value of
sensitivity77. Because there is no clear, a priori ground truth in this experiment,
absolute values of sensitivity were used to estimate metacognitive sensitivity and
efficiency, which allows to specifically estimate how confidence judgments tracked
the precision of decisions, over and beyond the idiosyncrasies that were observed at
the perceptual level (that are reflected in the polarity of the relationships between
decisions and sensory evidence).
Internal noise. Following an established procedure49,50, we converted the percen-
tages of agreement into values of internal noise using a computational SDT model
with response bias and late additive noise. This model assumes that the internal
representation of each stimulus, before the addition of internal noise, follows a
normal distribution centered on zero. Each representation is then corrupted by
internal noise, modeled as a Gaussian noise source with standard deviation σ. Thus
the only thing that differs between repeated presentations of the same stimulus is
the sample of noise, which is drawn randomly from the Gaussian distribution for
each repetition. On each trial, the model selects the stimulus of the pair associated
with the largest value but is allowed to favor one interval over the other, which is
implemented by a response criterion c that can differ from zero. Different values of
σ and c lead to different percentages of similar responses given to repeated pre-
sentations of the same stimulus (percentage of agreement; referred to as pc_agree)
and to different probabilities to select the first interval over the second (referred to
as pc_int1), respectively. For each trial i, we can define:
si: the difference between the representation of the stimulus presented in the
second interval subtracted from the representation of the stimulus presented in the
first interval; si= s_interval_2− s_interval_1, and follows a Gaussian distribution
with mean=0 and SD= 1; it is the same for the two repetitions, because the stimuli
are identical.
σir: the difference between the noise sample added to the stimulus of the second
interval subtracted from that of the first interval; σir= σr_interval_2−
σr_interval_1, and follows a Gaussian distribution with mean=0 and SD= σ; it is
different between the two repetitions r1 and r2; we note σi1 for the first repetition
and σi2 for the second repetition.
For each pair of stimuli and repetition, the SDT model with response bias c
selects the stimulus presented in interval 1 if (si+ σir) < c, and the stimulus
presented in interval 2 otherwise. There is agreement between the two repetitions
(i.e., pc_agree= 1) if ((si+ σi1) > c and (si+ σi2) > c) or if ((si+ σi1) < c and (si+
σi2) < c). We ran computational simulations based on this formula to assess
pc_agree and pc_int1 (averaged over the two repetitions) for different values of σ
and c. A fitting procedure was then used to search for the specific values of σ and c
that minimized the mean-square error between the values of pc_agree and pc_int1
predicted by the above model and the empirical estimates of pc_agree and pc_int1
observed in each task. Critically for the present study, this procedure allows
controlling two aspects. First, it allows us to check that the observations made from
the percentage of agreement are robust after accounting for interval response bias:
the percentage of agreement does not return a transparent measure of consistency
in a task where there is no ground truth, in particular because of potential response
bias19 (e.g., imagine participants who would select response B after every trial: their
percentage of agreement would be 100%, but this would be related to a strong
decisional bias rather than choice consistency). In comparison, the internal noise
values estimated with the SDT model accounting for response bias described above
do return a transparent, readily interpretable image of individuals’ consistency.
Second, consistency estimates previously reported in the psychophysical literature
are most often expressed in terms of internal noise (in units of external noise),
because it allows comparing tasks related to different stimuli dimensions and
involving different difficulties. Thus converting percentage of agreement values
into internal noise estimates also allows us to compare our values to these
references. Only values that fell within the interpretable range [0.2; 5] returned by
the SDT model50 were considered for analyses (which was the case for 18 out of the
19 participants).
Study 2
Participants. A new group of 40 (21 females, mean age= 27 years+/− 4.7 SD)
French listeners participated in Study 2. Sample size was determined a priori based on
a recent study using a similar methodology26. Participants were recruited via the
INSEAD pool; 32 out of the 40 participants were students, 4 were employees, and 4
were unemployed, so the sample was not very diverse in terms of socio-economic
status. Participant’s family income was distributed as follows: <500 euros (N= 1),
between 500 and 2000 euros (7), between 2000 and 5000 euros (N= 23), >5000 euros
(N= 6), not reported (N= 3). All reported having no hearing impairments and were
native speakers of French. These participants also participated in a speech production
task whose results will be reported in a different article18. Participants signed a
consent form and were remunerated for their participation. Ethical approval was
obtained, and experimental data were collected at INSEAD/ Sorbonne University
Center for Behavioral Science.
Stimuli. Stimuli were constructed from the same spoken pseudo-words used in
Study 1, but this time specific acoustic manipulations (as opposed to the random
manipulations used in the first experiment) were applied to the original stimuli.
Precisely, we modified the pitch, loudness, and duration of the 16 original stimuli
(8 pseudo-words and 2 speakers) so that they match the four archetypical dynamic
filters derived from the reverse correlation study (certain, honest, doubt, lie). These
modifications were applied with three different levels of gains, with the maximum
level of gain chosen so that the maximum value of the kernel approximates the
original value chosen as a maximum for the first study, ensuring that the
manipulated voices would still sound natural to the listeners.
Procedure. Study 2A. Participants were separated into two subgroups and rated
either the certainty of the speaker (N= 20) or the dishonesty of the speaker (N=
20) on a 7-point Likert scale (Study 2A). Participants heard each stimulus twice,
resulting in 384 trials. The order of presentation of the stimuli was randomized in
two blocks of 192 stimuli for each participant. The task was coded in Python with
the psychopy toolbox78.
Study 2B: At the end of Study 2A, participants were asked 12 questions
regarding their concepts about lying and doubtful prosodies in a directed debriefing
session. These questions were specifically designed to probe participants concepts
about how certainty and honesty affect speech prosody for the three acoustic
dimensions examined in this study (pitch, duration, and loudness) and concerned
static (according to you, someone who is certain/lying will speak with a high/low
pitch, high/low volume, fast/slow speech rate?) or dynamic (according to you,
someone who is certain/lying will speak with a falling/rising intonation, increasing/
decreasing loudness, accelerating/decelerating speech rate?) aspects. The order of
the questions was counterbalanced across participants.
Analysis. Participants’ ratings were z-scored before being averaged for each level of
gain in each task. Ratings were also split depending on participants’ responses to
conceptual knowledge questions. The percentage of agreement for the six questions
regarding concepts about certain and lying prosodies was computed by reverse
coding the responses given for lie to allow direct comparisons between the two
attitudes. Conceptual distance (Fig. SVII.C) was computed for each participant as
the average agreement for responses given to the questions concerning knowledge
about certain and lying prosodies. Perceptual distance was computed for each
participant as the average of the absolute differences between ratings given for
certain/honest versus ratings given for doubtful/lying prosodies in the listening test.
Study 3
Participants. Two separate groups of native English (N= 22, 10 females, mean age=
29+/− 9.55 years) and Spanish (N= 21, 12 females, mean age= 33.7+/− 8.39
years) speakers with no exposure to French were tested on the same certainty task as
Study 2. We also tested a third group of 12 speakers of various native languages (4
females, mean age= 26.7+/− 5.55 years) who had a limited exposure to French (and
English) on the same certainty task (instructions were in English): two German
speakers (males), two English speakers (1 male), one Russian speaker (male), one
Marathi speaker (male), one Spanish speakers (female), one Polish speaker (female),
one Japanese speaker (male), one Swedish speaker (male), one Dutch speaker (male),
and one Mandarin Chinese speaker (female). The group of multi-language speakers
was recruited via the INSEAD pool, English speakers via the pool of University
College London (London, United Kingdom), and Spanish speakers via the pool of the
Universidad Del Desarrollo (Santiago, Chile); all but 2 of the 22 native English
speakers were students, all but 2 of the 21 native Spanish speakers were students, and
5 of the 12 multi-language speakers were students (1 was unemployed, 6 were
employees), so the sample was not very diverse in terms of socio-economic status.
Participants’ level of comprehension of French was assessed through self-reports and
an objective comprehension test in order to assess the impact of language proficiency
on their perception of epistemic prosody. Self-reports consisted of three scales on
which participants had to report (1) their general level of comprehension of spoken
French, (2) their ability to have a basic conversation, and (3) their ability to perceive
French intonations, from scales ranging from 0 (nothing at all) to 6 (native). The
objective test involved five four-alternative forced choices (https://www.ciep.fr/tcf-
tout-public/epreuves-obligatoires-comprehension-orale) allowing us to compute an
objective score of comprehension. Participants reported very limited understanding of
spoken French (M= 0.91+/− 1 SD), a low ability to have a basic conversation (M=
1.08+/− 1.11 SD), and a relatively low understanding of French intonation (M=
1.42+/− 0.86 SD). Participants signed a consent form and were remunerated for their
participation. Ethical approval was obtained at INSEAD/Sorbonne University Center
for Behavioral Science. Speakers of the multi-language group were tested at INSEAD
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or IRCAM (Paris, FR). English speakers were tested at University College London
(UK) and Spanish speakers at the Universidad Del Desarrollo (Santiago, Chile).
Procedure and stimuli. These were the same as in the certainty task of Study 2, the
only difference being that the instructions were translated in their respective native
languages for the group of English and Spanish speakers and in English for the
group of multi-language speakers.
Study 4
Participants. Participants in Study 3 were the same group of 40 participants as in
Study 2.
Stimuli. Stimuli were a subset of the sample used for Study 2. There were 64
archetypal stimuli (corresponding to 8 pseudo-words, 4 prosody types, and
2 speakers) with an intermediate level of gain.
Procedure. Participants heard 6 pseudo-words separated by 1-s inter-stimulus
intervals while fixating a cross in the middle of the screen. They then saw three
alternatives appear on the screen: a target pseudo-word, which was present in the
stream, and whose position and prosody was fixed, and two distractors that did not
appear in the stream. Participants had to indicate which word they thought was
present in the stream by pressing an arrow on the keyboard (left, down for middle,
or right), before reporting their confidence on a scale from 1 to 4. The archetypal
prosody of the target (certain/honest/lie/doubt) and the position of the target in the
audio stream (1–6) were randomized with a Latin square for each participant and
each stimulus type (8 pseudo-words and 2 speakers), resulting in 384 trials. Dis-
tractors were two alternative pseudo-words that were not present in the audio
stream and had random prosodies taken from the same pool of stimuli. The spatial
position of the target on the response screen (left/middle/right) was randomized at
each trial. The task was coded in Python with the psychopy toolbox.
Analysis. Outlying values for response times (i.e., response times exceeding the
third quartile +1.5 interquartile range) were excluded. This resulted in the
exclusion of 4.6% of the trials and did not change the main results concerning
accuracy and confidence but revealed an effect of reliability on response times that
was not visible before pre-processing. Accuracy, response times, and confidence
were averaged for each participant, position in the stream, and prosodic type
(reliable: certain/honest versus unreliable: lie/doubt). Values obtained for unreliable
prosodies were then subtracted from the values obtained for reliable prosodies.
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
Additional raw data are available on the Open Science Framework via this link: https://
osf.io/upkzy/?view_only=ceb3ba0500d74cf3a3c42d9a31fb0d91. Source data are provided
with this paper.
Code availability
All analysis scripts are available on the Open Science Framework via this link: https://osf.
io/upkzy/?view_only=ceb3ba0500d74cf3a3c42d9a31fb0d91. The C.L.E.E.S.E. software
used to modify vocal recordings is available at: https://forum.ircam.fr/projects/detail/
cleese/.
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